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The Endangered Species Act:
Tramping on Tribal Rights?1
I.

OVERVIEW OF PROVISIONS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT WHICH
MOST AFFECT TRIBAL RIGHTS.
A.

ESA S 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. S 1533 f a W l ) :

Authorizes the

Secretary of the Interior (or Secretary of Commerce,
depending on the species) to list a species as
"endangered" or "threatened" based on certain statutory
criteria.
B.

ESA S 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. S 1536(a)(1):

Requires all

federal agencies to use their programs and authorities
to further the purposes of the ESA by carrying out
programs for the conservation of endangered and
threatened species.
C.

ESA S 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. S 1536(a)(2):

Requires each

federal agency to insure that any action it authorizes,
funds or carries out is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of designated critical habitat.
This section mandates consultation with the Secretary
of the Interior (or the Secretary of Commerce) to
insure against the likelihood of jeopardy or adverse
modification of critical habitat.
D.

ESA S 9(a) m .

16 U.S.C. S 1538 (a) (1):

Prohibits "any

person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" from importing, exporting, "taking,"
possessing, selling, offering for sale, delivering,

1
Adapted from an outline presented by Robert C. Baum of
the Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior at
the 1994 Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference.
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carrying, transporting, or shipping an endangered
species of fish or wildlife, or from violating any
regulation applicable to endangered or threatened fish
and wildlife species.
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)
plant species).)

(See also ESA § 9(a)(2), 16

(prohibitions applicable to listed

The "take" prohibition is extended to

threatened species by regulation, unless "taking" is
permitted by a special rule applicable to the species
in question.

50 C.F.R. § 17.31.

"Take" is broadly

defined as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct."
1532(19).

ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. §

"Harass" is defined by regulation to mean

"an intentional or negligent act or omission which
creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but
are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering."
"Harm" is defined by regulation to mean "an act which
actually kills or injures wildlife.

Such act may

include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering."
§ 17.3.

50 C.F.R.

See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of

Communities for a Great Oregon. 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995);
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co.. 50
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995).
E.

ESA S 10. 16 U.S.C. S 1539:

Provides exceptions to the

prohibitions of ESA § 9 including, inter alia, an
exception whereby the Secretary may permit the taking
of a protected species if such taking is incidental to
an otherwise lawful activity and the permittee has
submitted a conservation plan that provides for
mitigation measures and funding mechanisms to implement
2

the conservation plan..

An express exception to the

take prohibition of ESA § 9 is also provided for
Alaskan Natives (and non-native permanent residents of
an Alaskan native village) if the taking is primarily
for subsistence purposes.
II.

APPLICABILITY OF ESA TO TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
A.

Direct Taking Situations:

Native American hunting and

fishing protected species for commercial or
noncommercial purposes may be an ESA § 9 violation in
some situations.
1261 (8th Cir.)

See United States v. Dion. 752 F.2d
(en banc)

("Dion I") (taking of eagles

for commercial and non-commercial purposes), on remand.
762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985)

("Dion II") , rev;d in

part and remanded. 476 U.S. 734 (1986)

("Dion III");

cf. United States v. Bresette. 761 F.Supp. 685 (D.
Minn. 1991)

(sale of items partially composed of

feathers from birds protected by the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et sea.).
B.

Incidental Taking Situations;

economic development

activities may involve the incidental take of protected
species, in violation of ESA § 9.

City of Las Vegas v.

Luian. 891 F.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

("The

relocation of a listed species or the alteration of its
habitat during constructing activities constitutes an
'

incidental taking' that is prohibited by the [ESA]

unless the Secretary grants a special permit");
Appendix A, November 19, 1993 letter to Honorable Ada
Deer from Thomas W. Fredericks; Pacific Northwest
Generating Coop v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir.
1994)

(loss of a few endangered salmon constitutes an

incidental taking where they were caught because they
are visually indistinguishable from an unendangered
fish which was intended to be caught).
3

The Secretary

can grant a permit for such incidental takings under
the circumstances listed in ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. §
C.

1539(B)(2).
Agency Action:

federal approval of a lease or other

action requires consultation under ESA § 7 if it may
affect a protected species.
III. APPLICABILITY OF ESA § 9 TO NATIVE AMERICAN TAKINGS.
A.

Definition of "Person":

the prohibitions of ESA § 9

apply to "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States."

See ESA § 3(13), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13)

(defining "person" as, inter alia, "any . . . entity
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States").
Native Americans are persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.

See United States

v. Nuesca. 773 F.Supp. 1388, 1391 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd
945 F .2d 254 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Billie.
667 F.Supp. 1485, 1491 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Appendix B,
Solicitor's Opinion M-36926 of November 4, 1980, 87
B.

I.D. 525, 527 (1980)

("Martz Opinion").

Scope of Exception:

Congress provided a limited

exception in the ESA for non-wasteful Native Alaskan
takings of endangered or threatened species "if such
taking is primarily for subsistence purposes."
10(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e).2

ESA §

Courts have concluded

that the ESA's exception for Native Alaskan takings
does not extend to takings by other Native Americans.
Nuesca. 773 F.Supp. at 1390-91; 945 F.2d at 257.
2
Although Native Alaskans enjoy a limited right to take
species that are otherwise protected by the ESA, that right may
be regulated whenever the Secretary of the Interior (or,
depending on the species, the Secretary of Commerce) determines
that the Native Alaskan taking "materially and negatively affects
the threatened or endangered species. . . . "
ESA § 10(e)(4), 16
U.S.C. § 1539(e)(4).
4

Tribes arguably may enjoy rights to economically
develop their reservations and, in the process,
incidentally take protected species.
Fredericks letter at 9-11.
C.

See Appendix A,

Limitation. Modification or Abrogation of Treaty Rights
bv the ESA:

the Department of the Interior has

concluded that the ESA's "take" prohibition applies to
hunting and fishing by all Native Americans (with the
limited statutory exception for Native Alaskan
subsistence uses) even where treaty rights may be
implicated:
The [ESA] applies to Native
Americans because treaty hunting
and fishing rights simply do not
include the right or power to take
threatened or endangered species.
Appendix B, Martz Opinion, 87 I.D. at 529 and 535.3
Interior takes the position that the line of reasoning developed
under the Puyallup decisions and their progeny (that treaty
rights do not include the right to take listed species) is

3
See Antoine v. Washington. 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975);
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe. 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973);
Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Hodel. 808 F.2d 741, 750 (10th Cir.
1987); United States v. Eberhardt. 789 F.2d 1354, 1362 (9th Cir.
1986); Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin. 760 F.2d 177, 183
(7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Oregon. 718 F.2d 299, 305 (9th
Cir. 1983; United States v. Frvberg. 622 F.2d 1010, 1015 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); United States v.
Billie. 667 F.Supp 1485, 1490-92 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In United
States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 n.5 and 745 (1986), the Supreme
Court held that Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668 et seg. ,
abrogated the treaty right of the Yankton Tribe to hunt bald and
golden eagles but specifically left open the issues of whether
the treaty encompassed the right to take threatened or endangered
species or whether the treaty right was abrogated by the
Endangered Species Act. In United States v. Jim. 888 F.Supp.
1058 (D. Or. 1995), the federal court held that prosecuting an
Indian exercising his treaty right for killing eagles under the.
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act and the Endangered Species
Act did not violate his rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993.
5

preferable to the abrogation analysis described above:
There is a rule of construction which directs
that a statute and an Indian Treaty must be
construed in harmony, to the extent possible.
There is another rule which states that
treaties are not to be construed to the
detriment of the Indians, and a third rule
which states that abrogation or modification
of treaty rights by Congress are not to be
lightly imputed. The question of abrogation
or modification need not even arise if there
is no irreconcilable conflict between a
treaty and the statute. It is my opinion
that the [ESA] is in complete harmony with
the exercise of treaty hunting and fishing
rights by Indians because those rights do not
include the right to take endangered or
threatened species and thus application of
the Act to Indians does not restrict or
abrogate their treaty rights.
Appendix B, Martz Opinion, 87 I.D. at 527 (citations omitted).
The Martz Opinion goes on to state that by making treaty rights
subject to regulatory control under the ESA rather than
abrogating them, "[t]his approach ultimately preserves the rights
of the Indians while at the same time addressing the critical
wildlife problem recognized by Congress in the ESA."

Id. at 530.

If attempts to recover the species are successful, the treaty
rights would again permit takings of that species.

Id. at 530

n.6.
D.

Means of Lifting the Take Prohibition.
1.

Endangered species:

the prohibition on the taking

of species listed as "endangered" was established
by statute, ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1)(B), and can only be lifted by the means
described in the ESA.

To permit economic

development activities to go forward where the
taking of endangered species may result, ESA §
10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B), authorizes
the Secretary to permit "any taking otherwise
prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title
6

if such taking is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity."

Such permits may only be issued

if the applicant submits a conservation plan that
includes certain necessary elements including,
inter alia, mitigation measures and funding.

ESA

§ 10(a)(2)(A)(ii), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii).
2.

Threatened species:

there is no statutory bar to

the taking of species as "threatened" under the
ESA, only a general regulatory bar to such takings
in the absence of a special rule.
17.31.

50 C.F.R. §

ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d),

authorizes the Secretary to "issue such
regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to
provide for the conservation of such species."
Section 4 (d) provides an opportunity for
regulations that, when consistent with the
conservation of the species in question, may
exempt threatened species from the taking
prohibition in order to facilitate tribal economic
development or to enable tribal members to
exercise their fishing and hunting rights.
Otherwise, a n <incidental take permit may be
obtained.
IV.

50 C.F.R. § 17.32.

APPLICABILITY OF ESA § 7.
A.

Federal Actions Subject to Consultation Requirement:
to the extent tribal economic development activities
require action by a federal agency, that agency has a
duty, "in consultation with and with the assistance of
the Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce, depending
on the species],

[to] insure that any action

authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . .
is not likely too jeopardize the continued existence of
7

any endangered species or threatened species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of
[critical] habitat of such species" unless an exemption
is granted.

ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

This requirement is triggered by a wide range of
federal actions related to reservation development
including providing grants or loans and approving
leases or other agreements.4
B.

Results of Consultation:

the process of consultation

with the Secretary of the Interior (or Commerce)
results in a biological opinion on whether the proposed
action will jeopardize a listed species or result in
the destruction of its critical habitat.

If the

proposed action will not have such impacts, the action
i

may go forward subject to any mandatory terms and
conditions in the statement allowing incidental take.
50 C.F.R.

§ 402.14(i).

The action agency may choose

to implement the Secretary's nonmandatory conservation
recommendations.

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(j).

If, however,

the Secretary believes the proposed action would result
in jeopardy, the Secretary must either include
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the proposed
action or state that no such alternatives are known.
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3).

The action agency has the

ultimate responsibility to act on the Secretary's
biological opinion in a manner that is consistent with
its duty to prevent jeopardy to the protected species
or adverse modification of its critical habitat.

4
Consultation under § 7(a)(2) is not required where the
federal agency lacks any authority or discretion to influence the
proposed action. Sierra Club v. Babbittr 65 F.3d 1502, 1508-09
(9th Cir. 1995).
8

V.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE ESA AND TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES.

A.

General Standards.
A recent Secretarial Order clarifies the Department of
the Interior's responsibilities for trust resources,
requiring the component bureaus and offices of the
Department, inter alia. (1) to "operate within a
government to government relationship with federally
recognized Indian tribes";

(2) to be "aware of the

impact of their plans, projects, programs or activities
on Indian trust resources";

(3) to "explicitly" address

any anticipated effects on trust resources when engaged
in the planning of any proposed project or action; and
(4) "to consult with the recognized tribal government
with jurisdiction over the trust property that the
proposal may effect. . . . "

Appendix C, Order of the

Secretary of the Interior No. 3175 (Nov. 8, 1993).

See

also, Appendix D, the Native American Policy of the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (June 28, 1994).
The interplay between the Secretary's trust
responsibility and his affirmative obligation to
conserve threatened and endangered species in a context
in which they support and reinforce each other is
illustrated by two cases involving the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe's water and fish resources, Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton. 354 F.Supp. 252
(D.D.C. 1973), and Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy
Dist.

V.

Watt. 537 F.Supp. 106 (D. Nev. 1982), and 549

F.Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982), aff'd, 741 F.2d 257 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1083.

In the

Pyramid Lake case, which was decided before the
enactment of the 1973 Endangered Species Act, the
Secretary was ordered to utilize the full extent of his
authority to fulfill his trust obligations to the Tribe
by securing as much water as possible for the Pyramid
9

Lake fishery and by reducing diversions of water away
from the Pyramid Lake to a federal reclamation project
to the full extent of his authority.

In Carson-

Truckee. the district court held that the Secretary was
affirmatively obligated under § 7(a)(1) of the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1), to
operate a federal reclamation dam and reservoir to
benefit Pyramid Lake's endangered and threatened
species even though the project originally was
authorized for other, inconsistent purposes.

The ESA

was held to take precedence over the project's original
purpose.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed while

stating that it was not necessary to determine whether
the Secretary was obligated to operate the reclamation
facilities in that way because he had voluntarily
decided to do so.
B.

Tailoring ESA Enforcement to Promote Trust Objectives.
1.

Listing of species and designation of critical
habitat:
a.

One of the statutory criteria for listing a
species as endangered or threatened is "the
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms.
. . ."

ESA § 4(a)(1)(D), 16 U.S.C. §

1533(a)(1)(D).

The existence of adequate

tribal regulatory mechanisms may obviate the
need to list a species pursuant to the ESA.
b.

"Critical habitat" for a listed species
includes the physical or biological features
that are essential to the conservation of the
species and "which may require special
management considerations or protection.
."

ESA § 3(5)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. §

1532(5)(A)(i).

Information submitted by

tribal governments could demonstrate that
reservations lands do not contain the
10

. .

physical or biological features essential to
species conservation or that, due to the
adequacy of existing tribal management of the
lands, no special management considerations
or protection are required.

See Attachment

E, Memorandum from Regional■Director, Fish
and Wildlife Service, Region 2 to Area
Directors, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Albuquerque, Phoenix, and Window Rock at 2-4
(Dec. 6, 1993)

("FWS Region 2 Memorandum")

(encouraging tribes to submit information
pertinent to critical habitat designation).
c.

Critical habitat designations take into
account the economic impact of designation,
and areas may be excluded from designation if
"the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the
benefits of specifying such area as part of
the critical habitat" unless failure to
designate the area as critical habitat will
result in the extinction of the species
concerned.
1533(b)(2).

ESA § 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. §
Tribes should "supply the [Fish

and Wildlife] Service information on lands
the Tribes believe should be excluded from a
final critical habitat rule," including
information on the economic impact of
proposed critical habitat designations.
Attachment E, FWS Region 2 Memorandum at 4.
2.

Special regulations for threatened species:

As

discussed supra, ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d),
authorizes special regulations for the taking of
threatened species.
a.
The regulations applicable to threatened sea
turtles demonstrate how ESA § 4(d) can be
creatively utilized to both conserve
11

threatened species and provide for Native
American takings.

The regulations provide

that the prohibition on the taking of
threatened sea turtles:
shall not apply with respect to the
taking of [green sea turtles] in
waters seaward of mean low tide for
personal consumption by residents
of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands if such taking is
customary, traditional and
necessary for the sustenance of
such resident and his immediate
family. Sea turtles so taken
cannot be transferred to non
residents or sold.
50 C.F.R. § 227.72(f)

(regulation adopted by

Secretary of Commerce)

(adopted by reference

by the Secretary of the Interior at 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.42(b)(1)(vi)).

This special provision

for indigenous subsistence takings was
adopted after the Secretaries considered both
the potential geographic range of subsistence
turtle consumption and the health of turtle
stocks within that range.
32800, 32806 (1978).

43 Fed. Red.

Subsistence taking was

not allowed for residents of Puerto Rico or
the Virgin Islands due to the absence of
indigenous natives; native Hawaiians were not
allowed subsistence taking due to fears of
over-exploitation of turtle stocks and the
ready availability of alternative food
sources.

Id.

However, a subsistence

exemption for residents of the Pacific trust
territories was warranted both by the
cultural reliance on sea turtle consumption
and by the relative health of western Pacific
turtle stocks,
12

id.

This special exception

survived an equal protection challenge by a
Native Hawaiian. See United States v.
Nuesca, 773 F.Supp. 1388 (D. Haw. 1990),
aff'd . 945 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1991).
b.

Special regulation such as the sea turtle
exemption can be tailored to permit those
resource uses which are most highly valued to
a tribe as a whole.

For example, the federal

government has adopted regulations which
allow takings of threatened species for
subsistence or ceremonial purposes but not
for commercial uses.
[T]he [treaty fishing right]
includes fishing for ceremonial,
subsistence, and commercial
purposes.
[The Department of the]
Interior balanced the Indians'
interest in fishing for these
various purposes in promulgating
the regulations. By according a
priority to subsistence and
ceremonial fishing, and imposing
the moratorium on the commercial
fishing, Interior sought to respond
to comments reflecting the views of
the majority of the Indians on the
Reservation.
United States v. Eberhrdt. 789 F.2d 1354, 1359
(9th Cir. 1986).
Similarly, a 4(d) rule could provide, where
consistent with the need to conserve a threatened
species, for takings associated with a highlyvalued tribal economic activity, while prohibiting
other activities that result in takings.
3.

Tribal involvement in recovery efforts:

recovery

plans developed pursuant to the ESA usually
involve the services of a recovery team composed
of public and private agencies and institutions,
and other qualified persons.
13

ESA § 4(f)(2), 16

U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2).

Tribal participation in the

recovery process can include representation on
recovery teams, providing comments on draft
recovery plans and implementation of recovery
plans by tribal ordinance or code.

Appendix E,

FWS Region 2 Memorandum at 1-2.
4.

Consultation by federal agencies on actions that
may affect a listed species:

when the ESA § 7

consultation process involves tribal interests,
the action agency can and should directly involve
affected tribes in the consultation process.
a.

Requiring that the offices of the Department
of the Interior consult with tribes affected
by their proposed actions, Appendix C, Order
of the Secretary of the Interior No. 3175
(Nov. 8, 1993), facilitates tribal
involvement in the consultation process.

b.

Tribal involvement in the consultation
process can include all phases of the formal
consultation process, including, but not
limited to, involvement in the action
agency's development and review of biological
assessments, invitations to each meeting
between FWS and the federal action agency,
the opportunity to provide scientific data
and to review data in the FWS record, and the
opportunity to review draft biological
opinions and recovery plans and to provide
comments on such drafts.

5.

Prosecutorial discretion under ESA § 9:

in

appropriate circumstances, the United States may
exercise its prosecutorial discretion in enforcing
ESA § 9 to take account of Native American
concerns.

For example, in 1975 Secretary of the

Interior Morton issued a "Policy Statement on
14

Indian Use of Bird Feathers" that allowed Native
Americans to "possess, carry, use, wear, give,
loan, or exchange among other Indians, without
compensation, all federally protected birds, as
well as their parts or feathers," but reiterated
that "the Department of the Interior will continue
to enforce against all persons those Federal laws
prohibiting the killing, buying or selling of
eagles, migratory birds, or endangered species, as
well as those laws prohibiting the buying or
selling of the parts or feathers of such birds and
animals."
6.

Appendix F.

ESA § 10 (a)(1)(B) incidental take permits: the
ESA requires that incidental take permits only be
issued when the applicant submits a conservation
plan that provides necessary funding for
mitigation measures.5

C.

Resolving Conflicts Between ESA and Tribal Activities.
1.

In its March 1995 Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake
River Salmon, the National Marine Fisheries
Service purported to recognize and take into
account the treaty and trust responsibilities of
the United States to Indian tribes.

The NMFS

listed five criteria which must first be satisfied
before the federal government would impose
restrictions on the exercise of treaty and other
Indian fishing rights which result in the

5 This same thing may happen when federal agency action is
the subject of formal consultation with the Fish and Wildlife
Service and the Service issues an incidental take statement
permitting the action to go forward. See ESA § 7(b)(4), 16
U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (requiring an incidental take statement to
specify the reasonable and prudent measures necessary to minimize
the impact of incidental take on a listed species and the
mandatory terms and conditions necessary to implement those
measures).
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incidental take of protected Snake River salmon
stocks.
a.

The restrictions must be:

reasonable and necessary for the conservation
of the fishery resource;

b.

the least restrictive measures available to
achieve the conservation purpose;

c.

not discriminatory against tribal fishing
activities;

d.

necessary because the conservation purpose
cannot be achieved through reasonable
regulation of non-treaty activities; and

e.

necessary because voluntary tribal
conservation measures are not adequate to
achieve the conservation purpose.

See Appendix G, Excerpts from March 1995 Proposed
Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon.
The most controversial and difficult to apply
aspect of these criteria is determining what does
or does not constitute "reasonable regulation of
non-treaty activities."

For example, do major

changes in the operation of federal dams, or
perhaps the removal of some dams, which would
increase the cost of electricity to all consumers,
constitute reasonable or unreasonable regulation
of non-treaty activities?

How much would the

price of electricity have to increase over what
period of time in order for the proposed
regulation to be unreasonable?6

The current

6

Significantly and by way of contrast, the April 1994 Record of
Decision issued by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management for Management of Habitat for Late-Successional and
Old-Growth Forest Related Species within the Range of the
Northern Spotted Owl, Appendix H states that tribal treaty rights
will not be restricted unless, among other things, "the
conservation purpose of the restriction cannot be achieved solely
16

positions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the
Fish and Wildlife Service on this vital and
apparently unresolved issue are set forth in
Appendices I, J and K.
2.

Another critical factor in applying Endangered
Species Act restrictions to treaty and trust
resources is determining "the environmental
baseline."

See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

If tribal

activities which may adversely affect protected
species are included within the environmental
baseline, then as a general matter, they will not
be subject to further restriction.

The federal

agencies administering the ESA currently enjoy a
significant amount of latitude and discretion in
determining what does or does not fall within the
environmental baseline.

See Wood, "Fulfilling the

Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native
Nations on Environmental Issues:

A Partial

Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises
and Performance," 25 Environmental Law 733, 785787 (1995).
3.

The application of the Endangered Species Act to
tribal treaty and trust resources also may present
issues of environmental justice.

See Appendix L,

President Clinton's February 11, 1994 Executive
Order No. 12898.
CONCLUSION
If applied sensitively and correctly, the Endangered Species
Act is a powerful tool which can and should be used to fulfill
the commitments of the United States to preserve and protect and,
if necessary, restore tribal treaty and trust resources and to
enable Indian tribes to achieve standards of living comparable to
their non-Indian neighbors.
by regulation of non-Indian activities."
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(Emphasis added.)
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Hon. Ada Deer
Asst. Secretary .For Indian Affairs
Department of Interior
1849 C St. N.W.
Washington DC 20240
Re:

Pish
&
Wildlife
Service's
assessment
of
a
$331,776
mitigation
fee
against
tribal
trust land development under the Endangered
Species Act

Dear Ms. Deer:
This letter
is written on behalf of the Fort Mojave Indian
Tribe to express
our objection to the Fish & Wildlife Service's
assessment of a
$331,776 fee on the Tribe as a condition of
developing its trust land.
As you know, the Tribe has leased
approximately 5,444 acres of reservation trust land for residential
and commercial/resort development.
Approximately 1,024 acres of
the land has been designated as habitat for the desert tortoise, a
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. The FWS has
issued a draft biological opinion and incidental take statement
pursuant to §§ 7 and 9 of the E.S.A. assessing the effect of the
development on the desert -t'ortoise. .* One of the mitigation measures
included in the
dr aft$,£op inion is the so-called mitigation fee
assessed against the tribe as a condition to developing its land.
It is our opinion that this assessment is unlawful in light of the
Secretary's fiduciary obligations to the Tribe, as well as the
Tribe's treaty right to use and develop its land. Accordingly, we
are requesting your assistance in getting the Department of the
Interior to eliminate its practice of assessing this mitigation fee
against tribal trust lands. Our reasons in support of this request
are set forth more fully below.
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BACKGROUND
1.

The Secretary's Obligations Under The Endangered Species
Act.

The purpose of the Aha Macav Development is to generate
revenue for the Tribe, enhance economic development on the
Reservation, and provide employment for tribal members.
Inasmuch
as the Tribe's lands are held in trust by the United States, the
Tribe's lease of the lands is subject to the approval of the BIA
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 415 and related regulations. This in turn
triggers the BIA's obligations under the National Environmental
Policy Act and, given the presence of the desert tortoise, the
consultation obligations under § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
The FWS's draft biological opinion was prepared pursuant to § 7,
and included an incidental take statement as required by § 9 of the
E .S .A .
Section 7 of the E.S.A. requires the BIA to consult with the
FWS to ensure that any agency action is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat.
25 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). After agency consultation, the
FWS must provide the BIA and the Tribe with a written opinion
detailing how the agency action affects an endangered or threatened
species or its critical habitat.
If jeopardy or adverse
modification is found, the FWS is then required to suggest
reasonable and prudent alternatives which the FWS believes would
not violate subsection (a)(2).
See generally. Pacific Northwest
Generating C o o p , v . Brown. 822 F.Supp. 1479, 1487 (D. Ore. 1993).
Section 9 of the E.S.A. prohibits the "taking” of an
endangered species.
The prohibitions of § 9 also apply to
threatened species, including the desert tortoise, by Agency
regulations issued pursuant to § 4 of the E.S.A. The term "take"
includes harm or harassment of a threatened or endangered species.
However, "incidental takings" are permitted as long as they comply
with the r e q u i r e m e n t s § ' 7 (o )(2) -of the E.S.A.
That provision
provides that a taking which complies with the terms and conditions
specified in a written statement provided under § 7(b) (4) (iv) shall
not be considered a prohibited taking of the species concerned.
Section 7(b) (4) (iv)
contains the requirements for the
incidental take statement.
It is issued as part of the § 7
biological opinion.
See Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986
F. 2d 1568, 1580 (9th Cir. 1993).
Section 7(b)(4) provides in
relevant part as follows:
If, after consultation
concludes that —

under

(a) (2) , the

Secretary
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(A) The agency action will not violate such
subsection, or offers reasonable and prudent
alternatives which the Secretary believes
would not violate such subsection; [and]
(B) The taking of an endangered species or a
threatened species incidental to the agency
action will not violate such subsection;

The Secretary shall provide the federal agency and the
applicant concerned, if any, with a written statement
that —
(i)

specifies the impact of such incidental taking
on the species,

(ii) specifies
those
reasonable
and
prudent
measures
that
the
Secretary
considers
necessary or appropriate to minimize such
impact, [and]

(iv) sets forth the terms and conditions . . . that
must be complied with by the federal agency or
applicant (if any), or both, to implement the
measures specified under clause . . . (ii) . .
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)
2.

(1993 Supp.).

The FWS's Draft Biological Opinion.

The FWS's draft biological opinion (HB.0.M) incorporates both
the § 7 biological opin-lorr;- and the- § 9 incidental take statement
required by the above^referenced provisions.
Significantly, the
draft B.O. concludes that development of the tribal lands will not
have a significant impact on the survival of the desert tortoise:
The Service has determined that the level of impact
described herein will not reduce appreciably the
likelihood of survival and recovery of the Mohave
population of the desert tortoise in the wild because:
(1) desert tortoise densities within the project site are
low, (2) the project site is near the Needles Highway and
the Colorado River, (3) the project area is not within an
area recommended for recovery, and (4) impacts to desert
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tortoises within the project site represent a small
impact to the Mohave population of the desert tortoises
when total desert tortoise population numbers and
geographical extent are considered.

It is our Biological Opinion that the proposed issuance
of leases for construction of residential, recreational,
and commercial developments on the reservation is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the
threatened Mohave population of the desert tortoise . .
. no critical habitat will be destroyed or adversely
modified by the issuance of these leases.
Draft B.O., pp. 10-11.
The FWS then incorporates the incidental take statement into
its Draft B.O. pursuant to § 9:
The Service anticipates that four desert tortoises may be
accidentally injured or killed by vehicles or equipment
during the development stage, that 20 desert tortoises
may be harassed by removal from the boundaries of the
development, that an unknown number of desert tortoise
eggs may be destroyed during the development phase, that
an unknown number of desert tortoises may be taken
through predation by ravens drawn to trash on the
construction site, that an unknown number of desert
tortoises may be taken indirectly in the form of harm
through increased noise associated with the operation of
heavy equipment on the site, and that a total of 1,024
acres of desert tortoise habitat may be destroyed as a
result of the development which could result in harm
and/or harassment of'desert tortoises.
Draft B.O., pp. 12-13.
To mitigate these .^potential impacts on the desert tortoise,
and in order for the exemption in § 7(o)(2) to apply, the FWS has
imposed eight mitigation measures with which the BIA and the Tribe
must comply (Draft B.O., p. 12)1.
of the eight mitigation
measures, the first seven are directly related to preventing or

The Draft B.O. indicates that the eight mitigation
measures were proposed by the BIA. However, it is our impression
that the mitigation fee was a condition forced upon the BIA by the
FWS, with which the BIA does not agree.
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minimizing any incidental taking of a desert tortoise within the
development, including:
(1) the education of all project employees as to the
threatened status of the species, and the potential penalties for
an unlawful taking;
(2) the construction of barriers (either a tortoise—proof
fence or a 12-foot swath of leveled land around the perimeter of
the lease site) and subsequent removal of tortoises from the lease
site with additional measures to prevent re-entry;
(3) measures to ensure that all construction activities are
confined within marked areas which have previously been cleared of
desert tortoises;
(4)
clearly marking
all tortoise burrows along road
easements/rights-of-way to prevent crushing, including measures to
ensure that tortoises do not enter rights-of-way thereafter by
grading a 12-foot belt along each side of the right-of-way so that
tortoises entering the right-of-way can be detected by their tracks
and removed by a qualified tortoise biologist on a daily basis, and
the placement of qualified tortoise biologists on the construction
site during all grading and construction activities to ensure that
the tortoises found are not harmed;
(5) the excavation and removal of all tortoise burrows or
nests found on the project site by qualified biologists;
(6) restricting storage and access of all equipment and
materials within the boundaries of the project site in existing
rights-of-way and access roads;
(7) the implementation' of a litter control program to avoid
attracting ravens.
B .0., p p . 5-7.
The eighth mitigaEion measure imposed, and the one to which
the Tribe strongly objects, is the imposition of a so-called
mitigation fee which the Tribe is required to pay into an account
administered by Clark County, which the FWS says is for "off-site
mitigation for the destruction of desert tortoise habitat." Draft
B.O., p. 7. The fee is imposed at the rate of $324 per acre for
1,024 acres of the leased premises considered to constitute desert
tortoise habitat (totaling $331,776) . The expressed purpose of the
mitigation fee is for "securing desert tortoise management areas
(TMA), habitat enhancement, and desert tortoise research." B.O.,
pp. 7-8.
The fee must be transferred prior to the initiation of
any construction activities.
The question is whether, under the
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circumstances of our case, the imposition of the mitigation fee is
beyond the scope of the FWS's authority.
DISCUSSION
Initially, I note that the mitigation fee is not expressly
authorized by the Endangered Species Act, or by the Secretary's
regulations promulgated thereunder.
Inasmuch as the FWS is
assessing the mitigation fee against trust lands within an Indian
reservation which was created for the express use and occupancy of
the Tribe, and because the draft B.O. expressly states that the
development will not jeopardize the continued existence of the
desert tortoise nor modify any critical habitat, it is my opinion
that the assertion of a mitigation fee is not within the FWS's
authority under § 7(o) of the E.S.A.
I seriously doubt that, in
cases where no critical habitat is affected, the mitigation fee is
lawful under the E.S.A. itself. Even so, when the mitigation fee
is weighed against the Secretary's fiduciary obligations to the
Tribe and the purposes for which the reservation was created, it
becomes clear that charging a fee as a condition of the Tribe's
development of its land is far beyond that which Congress intended
when it enacted the E.S.A.
1.

Legality of the Mitigation Fee Under §§ 7 and 9 of the
E.S.A.

Since no critical habitat is being affected by the tribal
development, and since the FWS's biological opinion expressly
states that the development is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the desert tortoise, there is no violation
of the substantive provisions of § 7. See Pacific Northwest, 822
F.Supp. at 1487-1488.
However, the FWS may require mitigation
measures even if there is no violation of § 7(a)(2).
Thomas v.
Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
Moreover, these
measures may be imposed under the incidental taking provisions of
§ 9.
Pacific Northwest, at 1488.
Section 7(o) of the E.S.A.
allows the agency to incidentally take a threatened species as long
as it is incorporated * into "terms and conditions imposed to
minimize the impact along with reasonable and prudent mitigation
measures." Id- at 148 8.'
The draft B.O. lists four reasonable and prudent measures
which the FWS considers necessary and appropriate to minimize the
incidental take.
The mitigation fee is imposed ostensibly to
implement reasonable and prudent measure No. 3 of the Draft B.O.,
requiring that measures be taken to "minimize destruction of desert
tortoise habitat, such as soil compaction, erosion, or crushed
vegetation, due to construction or maintenance activities."
Draft
B.O., p. 13. Although this language indicates that the measure is
aimed at mitigation measures on and around the lease site to
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prevent unnecessary habitat destruction, the requirement for
implementing this measure states that the fee is imposed "as
offsite mitigation for the destruction of 1,024 acres of desert
tortoise habitat.
Draft B.O.,
3b, p. 15.
This means the fee
need not be used for on-site activities, but can be used instead to
acquire tortoise management areas and habitat and hire more
biologists to help the FWS subsidize its work under the E.S.A. in
other areas. See Draft B.O., p. 8. In other words, the Tribe must
pay the FWS in order to develop its land, money which the FWS can
then use for purposes unrelated to the Tribe's own on-site
mitigation. Such a practice is akin to the imposition of a tax on
reservation development, which Congress has not authorized under
the E.S.A. or any other statute.
Further, the uses to which the
FWS can put the money off-site bears no resemblance to minimizing
destruction of habitat in and around the construction site, as
required by reasonable and prudent measure No. 3.
Moreover, the fee is imposed despite the fact that the § 7
opinion finds no adverse modification of critical habitat.
Instead, the draft B.O. purports to impose this fee under § 9 of
the E.S.A., which prohibits the taking of a threatened species,
without the special exemption authorized under § 7(o). Thus, the
FWS has effectively expanded § 7(a) (2)'s prohibition on adverse
modification of critical habitat by expanding the concept of a
taking under § 9 to include harm to noncritical habitat. This is
done by defining harm to include "significant habitat modification
or degradation that results in death or injury to listed species by
significantly impairing behavioral patterns." Draft B.O., p. 12.
Although the FWS's definition of harm to include significant
habitat modification was upheld #in Sweet Home Chapter Of
Communities For A Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806 F.Supp. 279 (D. D.C.
1992), aff'd 1 F .3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), not all habitat destruction
or modification constitutes harm. Instead, the modification must
be "significant." Id. at 286; see Palila v. Hawaii Dept, of Land
& Natural Resources. 852 F. 2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (habitat
destruction which could drive an endangered species to extinction
constitutes harm and is a. taking under § 9) .2
2
It is interesting to note that in affirming the District
Court's decision in Sweet Home the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
had some difficulty in accepting the proposition ^ that the
Secretary's definition of harm to include habitat modification was
lawful under the E.S.A.
Judge Sentelle's dissent likened the
Secretary's definition to one in which the FWS "would deem a
congressional authorization for the erection of 'No Smoking' signs
to authorize the adoption of regulations against chewing and
spitting."
1 F.3d at 11.
Equating the word "take" in § 9 with
significant habitat modification does seem to defy common sense.
As Judge Sentelle pointed out:
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In Sweet Home, the Secretary and the FWS themselves pointed
out that the determination of whether there has been harm to
habitat so significant as to constitute a taking requires an
evaluation of the species involved, the biological needs of that
species, and the degree of habitat modification.
Applying this
test here, we have a threatened (as opposed to endangered) species
whose habitat spans portions of four different states, and a
development which will admittedly not modify any critical habitat,
nor modify a significant portion of the desert tortoises'
noncritical habitat as a whole.
Given this, and inasmuch as the
Draft fi.O. concludes that the Fort Mojave Tribe's development is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the desert
tortoise, the imposition of a mitigation fee in addition to the
other seven reasonable and prudent measures cannot even be
justified under the E.S.A.*
3
*
I
When the Secretary's fiduciary
obligations to the Tribe and the Tribe's rights arising from the
creation of the Reservation are considered, this conclusion becomes
inescapable.
2.

The Federal Trust Responsibility And The Tribe's Treaty
Rights.

The Fort Mojave Indian Reservation was established by a series
of Executive Orders in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
The
reservation was generally set aside for the "use and occupation" of
. . . I see no reasonable way that the term "take" can be
defined to include "significant habitat modification or
degradation" as it is defined in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
I
have in my time seen a great many farmers modifying
habitat.
They modify by plowing, by tilling, by
clearing, and in a thousand other ways. At no point when
I have seen a farmer so engaged has it occurred to me
that he is taking game. Nor do I think it would occur to
anyone else that he was taking wildlife. He may be doing
something harmful to.wildlife, but he is not "taking" it.
1 F.3d at 1 2 r
If the FWS was stretching its definition of harm in Sweet
Home, one wonders how courts would treat the imposition of a
mitigation fee for the development of noncritical habitat, an
administrative leap even farther from the mandate of § 7.
3

The FWS's practice of assessing the mitigation fee also
seems to be inconsistent.
We know of at least one other draft
biological opinion issued in connection with activity on BLM lands
which has been designated Class I habitat. No mitigation fee for
the loss of this more important habitat has been imposed.
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the Tribe.
See, e .q ., Executive Order dated February 2, 1911,
reprinted
in Vol.
I Executive Orders Relating to Indian
Reservations, p. 14; see Arizona v. California. 373 U.S. 546, 598601 (1963). The Tribe's right to use the reservation undoubtedly
includes the right to lease its lands to raise revenue, and to
promote economic development and self-sufficiency in furtherance of
congressional goals.
Executive Order reservations merit “the same protection as the
Indian title to reservations created by treaty or statute." United
States v. So. Pac._Trans. Co.. 543 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1976).
Thus, the Tribe's right to use and develop the reservation in
furtherance of a federal purpose may not be abrogated or modified
unless Congress has made its intent to do so clear and plain.
United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, et al., 649
F.2d 1286, 1298 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
Nevada v. United States. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
Courts are split on the issue of whether and to what extent
the E.S.A. extinguishes tribal treaty rights.4 That question need
not be addressed here since we do not deal with a provision of the
statute itself, but rather the scope of a federal agency's
authority to administer the statute. The Tribe is not asserting a
treaty right to hunt desert tortoises to the point of extinction.
Rather, the Tribe asserts the right to develop its land free of
unnecessary constraints imposed by the FWS under the auspices of
the E.S.A.
The question then becomes to what extent may the FWS
limit or modify the Tribe's exercise of this right.
Although Congress has the right to modify a treaty right, it
does so only when circumstances arise which justify disregarding
important tribal rights:
We do not construe statutes as abrogating treaty rights
in a backhanded way,
in the absence of explicit
statement, the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty
is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.
Indian
treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast
aside.
Dion, 476 U.S. at 739 (citations and quotations omitted).

4

Cf. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1^70 (8th Cir.
1985) (en banc) rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 7347 -'(E.S.A. does
not abrogate treaty hunting rights); United States v._Billie, 667
F.Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (E.S.A. does abrogate treaty rights
to hunt and kill endangered species); see Pacific Northwest, supra,
822 F.Supp. at 1489; cf., United States v. Bresette, 761 F.Supp.
658 (D. Minn. 1991) (Migratory Bird Treaty Act did not abrogate
Indian's treaty right to sell migratory bird feathers).
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Moreover, in cases where a subsequent statute comes into conflict
with Indian treaty rights, the statute "should be harmonized with
the letter and spirit of the treaty so far as that reasonably can
be done." United States v. Pavne. 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924).
As
stated above, these rules of construction apply with equal force in
determining rights arising from an Executive Order reservation, and
a general statute such as the E.S.A. may not be interpreted to
authorize the extinguishment of this right without a clear showing
of congressional consent. Truckee-Carson, supra. 649 F.2d at 1298.
Normal rules of construction of statutes of general applicability
"do not apply when Indian treaty rights, or even nontreaty matters
involving Indians, are at issue." . E.E.O.C. v. Cherokee Nation, 871
F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989). Thus, any ambiguity as to whether
the E.S.A; authorizes a mitigation .fee as a condition to developing
reservation land must be resolved in the Tribe's favor "in order to
comport with traditional notions of sovereignty and with the
federal policy of encouraging tribal independence." Id.
Applying these rules of construction it is clear that the
E.S.A. may not be interpreted to authorize the imposition of a
$331,776 mitigation fee on reservation development, especially
where no critical habitat of an endangered species is being
destroyed and where other more direct measures are being taken by
the Tribe to minimize harm to the threatened desert tortoise. The
E.S.A. must be interpreted consistently with the Tribe's federally
protected right to use and develop the reservation. The imposition
of a fee to help subsidize the FWS's programs is neither authorized
by the E.S.A. nor necessary to carry out its purposes.
As such,
the fee unlawfully infringes on the Tribe's federally protected
right to utilize its reservation lands for economic development.
Not only does the mitigation fee infringe on tribal treaty
rights, it is directly contrary to the fiduciary duties owed by the
United States to the Tribe. The general trust relationship between
the United States and Indian tribes is undisputed, and "has long
dominated the Government's dealings with Indians."
Northern
Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F,2d 741, 750 (10th 6ir. 1987) citing
United States v. Mitchell ,— 463 U.S. .206 (1983).' Moreover, where as
here, federal statutes^, and a comprehensive set of regulations
require the Secretary to' approve tribal leases of reservation land,
this general trust responsibility becomes a strict fiduciary
obligation, under which the Secretary's conduct will be "judged by
the most exacting fiduciary standards." Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 (1942). The FWS is charged with the
same duties in its dealings affecting the Tribe.
Nance v.
Environmental Protection Agency. 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981) ;
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dept, of Navy. 898 F.2d 1410,
1420 (9th Cir. 1990) . Moreover, in cases such as this where the
Secretary administers a statute which conflicts with its fiduciary
obligations to the Tribe, the Secretary's conduct will be even more
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carefully scrutinized.
Navajo Tribe v. United States. 364 F.2d
320, 323 (Ct. Cl. 1966) j Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v Morton 354
F.Supp. 252 (D. D.C. 1972).
~------- '
The Tribe's leases in this case were approved under 2 5 U.S.C.
§ 415 and the BIA's regulations thereunder.
25 C.F.R. Part*162!
The
regulatory
scheme
governing leases
under
§ 415 is
comprehensive, and is dominated by the federal policy of ensuring
"the highest economic return to the [tribal] owner consistent with
prudent management and conservation practices." Gila River Indian
Community._v._ Waddell, 967 F.2d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
25 C.F.R. § 162.8).
Imposing a fee upon tribal trust land as a
pre-condition
of
development
is directly
contrary to the
Secretary's trust obligations and is not necessary to fulfill the
mandate of the E.S.A. The Secretary's administration of the E.S.A.
must be tempered by his fiduciary obligations to the Tribe, and I
can see no way of reconciling the two with the imposition of the
mitigation fee.
The Secretary has discretion to accept or reject mitigation
measures recommended by the FWS. See Tribal Village of Akutan v.
Hodel, 859 F.2d 651, 659 (9th Cir. 1988). In this case, inasmuch
as the Tribe's leases do not cover critical habitat and are not
likely to jeopardize the threatened desert tortoise, since the BIA
and the Tribe have agreed to seven mitigation measures to protect
against any harm to the species, and in light of the Tribe's treaty
rights
on
the
reservation
and
the
Secretary's
fiduciary
obligations, I believe the imposition of the mitigation fee is
unjustified.
Accordingly, the Tribe respectfully requests your
assistance in getting the FWS to omit the mitigation fee from the
final version of the biological opinion. The fee simply may not be
reconciled with the Secretary's trust responsibility or the Tribe's
federally protected right to develop its land.
The Phoenix Area Office has requested a meeting with the FWS
in Las Vegas during the week of November 29, 1993 to resolve
outstanding issues under the draft B.O. I would appreciate it if
you or someone on your staff could attend the meeting in support of
the Tribe on this particular issue and other concerns raised^ by the
BIA. I know that the'FWS is proposing an even greater mitigation
fee on the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe as a condition to development on
their reservation, and there are probably other tribes who have
been detrimentally affected by this practice. Your intervention^ on
behalf of the tribes could help convince the FWS that the practice
of imposing fees on tribes whose reservations encompass habitat of
the threatened desert tortoise is contrary to the principles I have
discussed in this letter, and should be discontinued.

Hon. Ada Deer
November 19, 1993
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I trust that you will give this matter your prompt attention.
Please let me know if you have any questions with respect hereto.
Very truly yours,

Thomas W. Fredericks
TWF:lid
cc:

Patricia Madueno, Fort Mojave Tribal Chairperson
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior
Walt Mills, Phoenix Area Director
Mike Anderson, Solicitor for Indian Affairs
Wayne Nordwall, Field Solicitor, Phoenix
Allen Anspach. Superintendent, Parker Agency
David L. Harlow. Fish & Wildlife Service
Jamie R. Clark, Chief, Division of Endangered Species

